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TORT LAW-NEGLIGENCE-DUTIES AND LIABILITIES TO THIRD PAR-
TIES-AcCOUNTANTS-The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held
that an accountant may be liable to a third party not in privity for
the negligent preparation of financial statements.
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335
N.W.2d 361 (1983).
Timm, Schmidt & Company (Timm), an accounting firm,
prepared financial statements for Clintonville Fire Apparatus, Inc.
(CFA) for the years 1973-1976.1 For the years 1974-1976, Timm
sent an opinion letter to CFA which stated that these financial
statements fairly presented the financial position of CFA and that
the statements were prepared in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles.'
In November, 1975, CFA applied for a $300,000 loan from Citi-
zens State Bank (Citizens).' After Citizens examined the financial
statements which Timm had prepared, the loan was granted.
In early 1977, while preparing CFA's 1976 financial statements,
Timm employees discovered that the 1974 and 1975 financial
statements contained a number of material errors., After the errors
were corrected, Citizens was informed by Timm of the errors.e Citi-
zens called all of its loans due and, as a result, CFA went into re-
ceivership and was ultimately liquidated and dissolved. 7 In Sep-
tember, 1979, Citizens filed an action against Timm and its
malpractice insurer, seeking to recover $152,214.44, the sum repre-
senting the amount outstanding on Citizens' loans to CFA as of the
date the complaint was filed.'
In March, 1980, Timm filed a motion for summary judgment
and, in support of its motion, submitted affidavits from every
1. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361
(1983).
2. Id. at 378, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
3. Id.
4. Id. The loan was guaranteed by the Small Business Administration. By the end of
1976, CFA had a total outstanding indebtedness to Citizens of approximately $380,000, al-
though not all loans comprised in this total were SBA guaranteed. Id.
5. Id. These errors totalled over $400,000 once all period adjustments were made. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 378-79, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
8. Id. at 379, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
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member of the Timm firm who had worked on the CFA account.'
Each affidavit stated that the affiant did not know, until after the
fact, that CFA intended to or had obtained any loans from Citi-
zens."0 An affidavit was also submitted by the accounting firm's
president, Elmer Timm, who stated that he did not know that any
audit report prepared by his firm for CFA would be used by any
lender for the purpose of determining whether or not to grant a
loan to CFA.11
Citizens submitted a number of affidavits in response to Timm's
motion for summary judgment.1 2 The affidavit of Den E. Hood, a
certified public accountant, stated that he had examined the audit
procedures that Timm's employees followed during the course of
preparing the financial statements for the years 1974 and 1975.18
Hood concluded that the procedures had not been conducted in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and that
the material errors in the 1974 and 1975 statements should have
been discovered and corrected prior to the issuance of each
statement.
14
The trial court granted Timm's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that, although under section 552 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 5 an accountant may be held liable to third par-
9. Id. at 379, 335 N.W.2d at 362-63. The Wisconsin procedural rule on summary judg-
ment provides: "The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as as matter of law." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 802.08(2) (West 1977).
10. 113 Wis. 2d at 379, 335 N.W.2d at 362-63.
11. Id. at 379, 335 N.W.2d at 363.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Citizens also submitted the affidavit of John Dando, CFA's president, in which
Dando stated that he believed that Timm was aware that statements its employees prepared
would be submitted to the Small Business Administration (SBA) and that audited state-
ments were a requirement of SBA loans. In addition, Citizens submitted an affidavit from
its president, Gerald Beier, in which Beier stated that Citizens' loans to CFA were made in
reliance on the financial statements prepared by Timm. Id. at 379-80, 335 N.W.2d at 363.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) reads:
552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others.
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
1186
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ties for their negligent acts, the Restatement did not extend
Timm's liability to Citizens in the present case.16
Citizens moved for reconsideration of this decision and submit-
ted a more specific affidavit from CFA's president which Citizens'
attorney had previously been unable to obtain.1" The trial court
denied this motion, concluding that the new affidavit was not suffi-
cient to raise an issue of fact to preclude the granting of Timm's
motion for summary judgment. s
Citizens appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, concluding
that, even if section 552 of the Restatement was assumed to be the
law in Wisconsin, there would still be no genuine issue of fact as to
whether Citizens was within the class protected by its provisions.1'
Thereafter, Citizens appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the trial
court, holding that an accountant's liability to third parties should
be determined under the established fundamental principle of
Wisconsin negligence law that a tortfeasor is fully liable for all
foreseeable consequences of his act except as those consequences
are limited by policy factors.2 0 Therefore, liability would be im-
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the infor-
mation to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a
substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit
the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to
protect them.
Id.
16. 113 Wis. 2d at 381-82, 335 N.W.2d at 363-64.
17. Id. at 382, 335 N.W.2d at 364. Counsel for Citizens explained that he could not
reach Dando earlier for a more specific affidavit because Dando was an adverse party in
another lawsuit and neither Dando nor his attorney would disclose Dando's location. The
trial court refused to grant Citizens' motion for leave to file this affidavit and did not con-
sider this affidavit in its decision. The trial court, however, in its decision on the motion for
reconsideration, stated that it would consider the affidavit. Id. at 382 n.4, 335 N.W.2d at 363
n.4.
18. Id. at 382, 335 N.W.2d at 364.
19. Id. See Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 108 Wis. 2d 771, 324 N.W.2d
296 (1982).
20. 113 Wis. 2d at 386-87, 335 N.W.2d at 366. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has set
out several public policy reasons for not imposing liability even when negligence is found to
have caused injury. These include:
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of
proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the neg-
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posed on the accountants in the instant case for foreseeable inju-
ries resulting from their negligent acts, unless, under the facts of
this particular case, the court determines as a matter of public pol-
icy that recovery should be denied.2" Further, according to the
court, Wisconsin law generally favors a full factual resolution
before evaluating the public policy considerations involved.22 The
court found that the record did not dispose of the issue of whether
it was foreseeable that a negligently prepared financial statement
could cause harm to Citizens.2
3
Justice Day, writing for the court, first looked to Chief Judge
Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares v. Touche,2' which has long been
relied upon by courts to absolve accountants from liability for their
negligence to relying third parties not in privity.25 In Ultramares,
Judge Cardozo realized the serious effect that the extension of lia-
bility could have: "[I]f liability exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder
S. . may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. ' '2 6
Justice Day, however, immediately questioned the validity of the
Ultramares decision and suggested that in recent years courts have
begun to expand accountants' liability to third parties as Ul-
tramares has received new attention.7 He noted that in Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin,2s the Federal District Court for the District
of Rhode Island cited section 552 of the Restatement and imposed
liability on an accountant to a third party who relied on the
financial statements prepared by the accountant.29 Similarly, in
ligent tortfeasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the
way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point.
Id. (citing Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 48, 288 N.W.2d 95, 110 (1980); Morgan
v. Pennsylvania Gen'l Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 737, 275 N.W.2d 660, 667 (1979); Stewart v.
Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79, 88 (1978); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526,
541, 247 N.W.2d 132, 140 (1976)).
21. 113 Wis. 2d at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
22. Id. at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
23. Id.
24. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
25. 113 Wis. 2d at 383, 335 N.W.2d at 364.
26. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
27. 113 Wis. 2d at 383, 335 N.W.2d at 364.
28. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
29. 113 Wis. 2d at 383, 335 N.W.2d at 364. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. at 93. Note, however, that in Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357
(10th Cir. 1971), the court was not persuaded by the Rusch Factors court's reasoning that
Ultramares should be rejected to extend accountants' liability to a third party not in priv-
ity. In the Stephens Industries court's opinion, "[t]he Rusch Factors case was an instance
1188 Vol. 22:1185
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Ryan v. Kanne,11 the Iowa Supreme Court decided that an ac-
countant could be held liable to a relying third party who was fore-
seeable; the Iowa court also applied Restatement section 552 in
reaching this result."'
Because the question of accountants' liability to a third party
had not yet been examined in Wisconsin, Justice Day analogized it
to the liability of an attorney to one not in privity, noting that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court had concluded in its recent decision of
Auric v. Continental Casualty Co.32 that an attorney may be held
liable to a will beneficiary not in privity for the attorney's negli-
gence in supervising the execution of a will.33 Part of the rationale
for the Auric decision was that the imposition of liability would
make the attorneys more careful in the execution of their duties
toward their clients." Justice Day found this rationale persuasive
in the instant case. In addition, he suggested that allowing the im-
position of liability on accountants would be a cost effective means
of spreading risk.3"
Having found that the absence of privity alone does not preclude
accountants' liability to relying third parties, the court next ad-
dressed the issue of who should be entitled to recover for account-
ants' negligence. It recognized that courts which have examined
this question generally rely on Restatement section 552, and noted
of a federal district court speculating as to what the state courts would do with this is-
sue. . . ." Id. at 360.
30. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
31. Id. at 402. The Iowa court applied the Restatement and concluded that the ac-
countant owed a duty of care to actually foreseen third parties who are members of a lim-
ited class of persons contemplated. Note, however, that later, in Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F.
Supp. 1155, 1176-77 (S.D. Iowa 1981), a narrow Ryan interpretation of the Restatement was
applied to deny recovery to third party general investors on their claim in negligence against
accountants who prepared information on which the investors relied. See infra notes 46-48
and accompanying text.
32. 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). Justice Day also wrote the Auric opinion
for the court.
33. 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365. Note, however, that in Ultramares, Judge
Cardozo recognized an exception to his no-liability approach for cases in which the profes-
sional performs a service for his client knowing that the specific purpose of the service is to
benefit a third party. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See infra notes 54-55 and accompa-
nying text.
34. 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
35. Id. Justice Day suggested that if creditors, as relying third parties, are not allowed
to recover, the cost of credit to the general public must increase as creditors would be forced
to absorb the costs of bad loans made in reliance on faulty information or hire accountants
of their own to verify tha financial statements received from borrowers. Alternatively, the
court suggested that accountants may spread the risk through the use of liability insurance.
Id. But see infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
Duquesne Law Review
that section 552 has not been interpreted to permit recovery to all
parties whom the accountant might reasonably foresee as using the
information. 6 The court, however, rejected the Restatement's de-
termination of limiting liability to certain third parties as being too
restrictive a statement of policy factors.3 7 Instead, the rule that a
tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act
except as those consequences are limited by policy factors was ac-
cepted by the court as the fundamental statement of Wisconsin
negligence law which was to be followed in determining liability in
the instant case.38 The court concluded that a full factual resolu-
tion was necessary before it could be said that public policy would
preclude Timm's liability for its allegedly negligent conduct.3 9
Citizens State Bank raised for the first time in Wisconsin the
issue of accountants' liability in negligence to a third party not in
privity.'0 The question has been examined recently in other juris-
dictions, and there is a substantial split of authority among the
states as to the approach to be taken in resolving this issue. 1
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the Ultra-
mares decision, it did not directly address the concerns expressed
by Judge Cardozo. In Ultramares, the accountants knew that the
financial statements which they had prepared and certified would
be shown to creditors, stockholders and possibly purchasers or sell-
ers of their client through the normal course of the client's busi-
ness dealings."2 Judge Cardozo realized that the potential existed
for a third party to be harmed through reliance on financial state-
ments negligently prepared by accountants; nevertheless, the third
party's claim against the accountants was denied based on policy
considerations.'3 Because the financial statements and accompany-
ing certificate prepared by the accountant belong to the client,
they can be shown to an indeterminate number of third parties
over an indefinite period of time, resulting in potential liability to
36. 113 Wis. 2d at 385, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
37. Id. at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 387, 335 N.W.2d at 366-67.
40. Id. at 382, 335 N.W.2d at 364.
41. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979, 989 (1972). See, e.g., Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (accountant liable for negligence to parties not in privity); Invest-
ment Corp. of Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (1968) (accountant may not be held liable for
negligence to a third party not in privity of contract with the accountant).
42. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
43. Judge Cardozo noted in Ultramares that the evidence supported a finding that the
audit was negligently made. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443.
1190 Vol. 22:1185
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accountants for an indeterminate amount." Clearly, Judge Car-
dozo was primarily concerned with the economic consequences of
extending liability to such a wide class of potential third parties,
when the accountant has no control in limiting that class and for
the benefit of which the third party pays nothing.
4
5
In a recent decision, an Iowa federal district court recognized
Judge Cardozo's concern and stressed that the extension of ac-
countants' liability to foreseeable third parties would have an "ex-
tremely disruptive effect on current accounting practices."' "4 The
accountants would be forced to protect themselves by increasing
the costs of the audit to the client, who in turn would pass the
increased cost on to lenders, investors and the general public.47 Al-
though the risk of negligently preparing financial statements may
be small, the magnitude of the potential liability is tremendous be-
cause of the indeterminate number of parties relying on the infor-
mation. Therefore, the impact on the accounting profession result-
ing from extension of liability could indeed be devastating.48
Restricting accountants' liability, rather than extending it to all
foreseeable third parties, then, involves a determination of public
policy. Because the potential for error always exists in the prepara-
tion of financial statements, if only to allow for the inevitable
human error, the question becomes which party should bear the
cost resulting from such error. In answering this question, it must
be noted that the third party has paid nothing to the accountan4 9
44. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. Error must exist in the implication of a duty that
would expose the accountants to such extreme consequences. Id.
45. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. Judge Cardozo suggested that the next step would have
been a similar extension of liability upon the proprietors of newspapers. Id. at 185, 174 N.E.
at 446-47.
46. Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
47. Id. The Briggs court noted further that present methods of raising risk capital
would be put in jeopardy as the cost of acquiring that capital is forced upward. Id.
48. Id. The possibility exists that unlimited liability will destroy the defendant who
momentarily lapses from proper care. W. PRossn, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107,
at 708 (4th ed: 1971). See, e.g., H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 422, 444
A.2d 66, 68 (1982), in which defendant accountants Touche Ross & Co. faced claims of
$100,000,000 in eight lawsuits for allegedly preparing financial statements in a negligent
manner, and upon which a corporation later relied in its decision to purchase accountants'
client corporation. Defendant contended that no insurance company would protect against
such liability, at least not at a premium that accountants could long endure. The Superior
Court of New Jersey applied the restrictive Restatement approach to the issue and denied
recovery. Id.
49. As Judge Cardozo suggested in Ultramares, "[w]e doubt whether the average busi-
nessman receiving a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one among a
multitude of possible investors, would look for anything more" than that the ensuing liabil-
ity for negligence is bounded by the contract, and in the absence of fraud, is to be enforced
1984 1191
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and is not bearing any cost associated with the inherent risk as-
sumed by the accountant in the preparation of the financial state-
ments. The accountant cannot directly pass the cost on to the
third party since the third party is unknown to the accountant.
Unlike other tort actions in which foreseeability is used to deter-
mine liability, the accountant has not reached out to harm an in-
nocent third party; rather, the third party has reached out to cost-
free information on which he then chooses to rely.
50
Further, the third parties involved in suits against accountants
generally have alternative means available to reduce potential
losses resulting from the inherent risk of errors in financial state-
ments on which they may choose to rely.51 A creditor may reduce
its risk of making a bad loan by requiring the company to pledge
collateral or make specific covenants to control the potential loss to
the bank." The accountant has no control over the bank's lending
policy, yet if this policy requires no more than reliance on a
financial statement, the creditor may attempt to recover from the
accountant when in fact the loss on the loan could be attributable
to the creditor's lenient lending policy.
53
between the parties by whom the contract has been made. 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
50. The Restatement also recognizes the need to distinguish between pecuniary loss
and harm resulting in personal injury. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. Note
that the creditor clearly benefits from its reliance on the cost-free information: "Although
most commercial banks take their highest risks in their loan portfolio, bank loans tend to be
the most profitable bank asset. This assertion has been substantiated by the Functional
Cost Analysis program recently offered by the Federal Reserve banks." H. CRossE & G.
HEMPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS 168 (2d ed. 1973). In addition,
"bank loans are an important means of creating and maintaining depositor relationships,
particularly with business firms." Id. at 169.
51. Banks generally recognize and should attempt to minimize the inherent risk of
lending by formulating and enforcing strict lending policies. "Well-conceived lending poli-
cies and careful lending practices are essential if a bank is to perform its credit-creating
function effectively and minimize the risk inherent in any extension of credit. A bank needs
policies specifying how much of what kinds of loans will be made to whom and under what
circumstances." Id. at 189.
52. Id. at 174. Restrictive covenants could include limiting dividend payments and
imposing ceilings on salaries of officers. For additional security, banks may obtain the en-
dorsements of principals as guarantors, especially when the borrower is a small or closely-
held business. Id. Further, credit review could include consideration of factors involving not
only the borrower, but data pertaining to other firms in the same industry, in determining
whether a loan should be granted. In addition, a five year average of financial statement
information could be used to decrease reliance on a single financial statement. K. COHEN &
F. HAMMER, ANALYTICAL METHODS IN BANKING 241-43 (1966).
53. Even when a bank has a lending policy, there is no assurance that it will be fol-
lowed. "Even the best lending officers are likely at times to become overenthusiastic about
the prospects of their good customers or to take for granted facts that should be carefully
checked and verified." H. CRossE & G. HEMPEL, supra note 50, at 204. "Many loans to small
1192
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Even under the restrictive Ultramares approach, public policy
considerations allow a third party to recover from an accountant
under certain circumstances. In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo distin-
guished the case of Glanzer v. Shepard," in which a professional
performed a service for his client knowing that the specific purpose
of the service was to benefit a third party.55 In such cases, the pro-
fessional clearly has a duty to the third party and the third party
can bring an action in negligence against the professional. 5" Aware
of this duty and of the intended reliance of a specifically known
third party, the professional could consider this potential limited
liability as a factor in determining the cost of his services8 1 This
cost could then indirectly be considered by the client and third
party as they negotiate between themselves. In this way, the cost
associated with the professional's services can reasonably be passed
on to a specific third party who relies on and benefits from the
service and that third party would have a claim in negligence
against the professional by showing that the professional owed a
duty of care to him as an intended beneficiary of the service."
The Restatement addresses the concerns expressed in Ul-
tramares by Judge Cardozo, but attempts to extend liability a step
further than Glanzer. The Restatement expresses the view that
or new enterprises or to businesses that are expanding rapidly could not be justified on the
basis of credit worthiness alone." Id. at 174. Yet it would be difficult for an accountant to
prove that a lending officer relied on his desire to keep a valued customer rather than on the
financial statement.
54. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). In Glanzer, a bean seller requested the defen-
dant public weighers to weigh beans and furnish the buyer with a copy of the weight report.
The public weighers' reports were made out in duplicate. One copy was sent to the seller
and the other to the buyer, the weight report reciting that it was made by order of the
former for use by the latter. The buyer paid the seller in relying on the certificate which was
later discovered to be erroneous. The Court of Appeals of New York held that the weighers
were liable for the buyer's overpayment. Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
In Ultromares, Judge Cardozo distinguished Glanzer as involving:
more than the rendition of a service in the expectation that the one who ordered the
certificate would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as occasion might
require. Here was a case where the transmission of the certificate to another was not
merely one possibility among many, but the "end and aim of the transaction....
255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
55. The third party would qualify as an intended beneficiary under the RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b) (1981) which requires that "the circumstances indicate
that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance."
Id.
56. See Glanzer, 233 N.Y. at 238-40, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
57. See generally GAInzer, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); REsTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
58. See supra note 57.
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when negligence results only in pecuniary loss, a more restricted
rule of liability than foreseeability should be adopted because of
the extent to which misinformation may be expected to be circu-
lated and the extent of the losses which may result from reliance
upon it.59 Although a user of commercial information may reasona-
bly expect the maker to prepare the information honestly, it does
not follow that every user may hold every maker to a duty of care.
Instead, the user may hold the maker of the information to a duty
of care only when the maker was manifestly aware of the use to
which the information was to be put and intended to supply it for
that purpose.60 The limitation of liability in this way reflects the
important social policy of encouraging the flow of commercial in-
formation upon which the economy rests.' The rule subjects the
negligent preparer of information to liability only to those for
whose benefit and guidance it is supplied."' Under the Restate-
ment approach, however, it is not necessary that the preparer have
a particular party in mind as the intended recipient of the infor-
mation; it is sufficient that the preparer intends the information to
reach either a particular known party or a class of persons, distinct
from the much larger class who must reasonably be expected to
eventually have access to the information and foreseeably rely
upon it." The Restatement rule does not, however, indicate how
small the "particular class" within the indeterminate class must be
for liability to be extended. 4 In extending liability further than
the specifically known third party exception that Judge Cardozo
59. See generally RESTATEwrr (SEcom) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Note that the cost to
a specific third party would be more reasonably subject to measurement than the cost to an
unlimited class. Id.
60. Id. at comment a.
61. Id. A duty of care between maker and user would imply an undertaking to observe
a standard, which could be defined only in terms of the use to which the information would
be put, weighed against the magnitude and probability of loss that could result if the infor-
mation was erroneous. Id.
62. Id. at comment h.
63. The risk of liability to which the preparer subjects himself by undertaking to give
the information is "vitally affected by the number and character of the persons, and partic-
ularly the nature and extent of the proposed transaction." Id. The accountant must be able
to consider these factors in determining the cost of the engagement and can thereby spread
the risk among those who rely upon the information. Id.
64. If, for example, an accounting firm knew that its client intended to submit
financial statements that it prepared to all creditors who asked for such information, it is
not clear whether any creditor could then bring an action in negligence against the account-
ants. "Creditors" is a class smaller than the class comprised of investors, creditors, share-
holders, buyers and sellers, but is itself a class comprised of various banks, suppliers and
individuals. Id.
1194 Vol. 22:1185
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recognized in Ultramares, the Restatement's approach does not
necessarily result in sufficiently limiting liability to prevent the re-
sults which the New York court sought to avoid. The cases which
apply the Restatement, however, closely parallel Glanzer."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not ignore the need to con-
sider public policy in resolving the issue of liability presented in
Citizens. The court did, however, reject the Ultramares approach.
The Wisconsin court also suggested that the Restatement was too
restrictive in its approach to liability." Yet following the court's
own policy considerations, the result requiring limited liability for
the reasons discussed by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares, or at the
very least the result suggested by the Restatement, would be
reached. 7
The court's holding that a case by case approach is required in
applying public policy does not reflect recognition of the distinc-
tion required as to pecuniary harm noted in the Restatement or
serious consideration of the effects of expansive liability. The cases
that the Wisconsin court relied upon involved a known third party
to the transaction and involved narrow application of the Restate-
ment. The court did not offer any convincing policy consideration
requiring an expansion of liability.
Citizens presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with the op-
65. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417, 444 A.2d 66 (1982) (citing
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (accountant knew that the
financial statements that he was preparing were for the sole purpose of being used by a
single potential creditor to his client); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (ac-
countants were hired by the client for the sole purpose of obtaining new financing and were
directed to consult with the creditors to determine what information was required); Rhode
Island Hosp. Tr. Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir.
1972) (loan agreement between the client and creditor expressly required the client to fur-
nish audited financial statements to the bank and the accountant knew that this was the
sole purpose of his work); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(accountants knew that the financial statements that they prepared would be used solely by
the closely-held corporation's five stockholders in negotiations with an acquiring company);
Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973) (contract for
the sale of stock required reports prepared by accountants and the accountants knew that
this use of the reports was the sole purpose of their work); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountants knew that the financial state-
ments that they prepared would be used only by plaintiff in considering whether to make
their client a distributor of its products)).
66. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
67. Among these considerations are that allowance of recovery could place "too unrea-
sonable a burden on the negligent tortfeasor," and that "allowance of recovery would enter a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point." 113 Wis. 2d at 386-87, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
Both of these policies are essential to .the Ultramares and Restatement approaches to re-
stricting liability. See supra note 20.
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portunity to establish the extent to which accountants should be
liable to third parties in Wisconsin. The court failed to address
specifically the policy issue and thus, the result is likely to cause
confusion and inconsistent decisions at the lower court level. Be-
cause the result of this case carries implications as to the extent of
liability in other professions, 68 the issue presented merits more se-
rious consideration than that offered by the court.
Julie E. McGuire
68. Judge Cardozo reflected in Ultramares:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other
than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or
corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the
public, will become liable to the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a
decision, to the same extent as if the controversy were one between client and ad-
viser. Title companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an
approaching auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the bidders, will
become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a policy without payment of
a premium. These illustrations may seem to be extreme, but they go little, if any,
farther than we are invited to go now.
255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
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